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Alex Alben* 
I. PRIVACY IS ESSENTIAL FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
Can we live in a free society without personal privacy? The question 
is worth pondering, not only in light of the ongoing debate about 
government surveillance of private communications,1 but also because 
new technologies continue to erode the boundaries of our personal space.2 
This Article examines our loss of freedom in a variety of disparate 
contexts, all connected by the thread of erosion of personal privacy. 
In the scenarios explored here, privacy reducing activities vary from 
government surveillance, personal stalking conducted by individuals, and 
profiling by data-driven corporations, to political actors manipulating 
social media platforms. In each case, new technologies and open platforms 
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 1. See, e.g., Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of 
Big Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 234 (2007); 
Christopher Cooke, Note, Securing Liberty: A Response to Debates on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 
12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889 (2014). 
 2. The erosion of personal space does not appear to completely dissuade consumers. One 
research firm has estimated that by 2022, twice as many smart devices will be shipped worldwide as 
were shipped in 2018, for an estimated total of 1.3 billion internet-connected devices. Anick Jesdanun, 
Home Items Are Getting Smarter and Creepier, Like It or Not, AP NEWS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www. 
apnews.com/12787de930564f2cbe8fadfdf63e2e7e [https://perma.cc/J5HS-QPAB]. These smart 
devices include technology that not only monitors the purchasing consumer, but also those who come 
into contact with them. Google recently introduced a smart doorbell that analyzes the faces of visitors 
and alerts the homeowner whether or not the visitor is a friend or family member. Samuel Gibbs, 
Google Launches Video Doorbell with Facial Recognition in UK, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/31/nest-hello-google-launches-facial-recognitio 
n-data-doorbell-uk-privacy-concerns-amazon-ring [https://perma.cc/7MD9-Y2W5]. Expanding the 
scope of consumer monitoring, retail chain Walmart recently patented a surveillance technology to 
record audio of the checkout process. Sam Levin, Walmart Patents Tech That Would Allow It to 
Eavesdrop on Cashiers, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jul/ 
12/walmart-surveillance-sound-sensors-employees [https://perma.cc/84M6-XDQF]. 
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are used by a bad actor to harm unwitting individuals. Additionally, the 
affected person has limited legal recourse to avoid the ill effects of 
intrusion or outright invasion of privacy. Taken together, these examples 
illustrate the need for new policies and regulation addressing modern 
threats to privacy and also the requirement to think globally about privacy 
as a basic right. 
II. THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
The vulnerability of data and its potential for political manipulation 
or misuse was underlined by the well-publicized and well-documented 
attacks by Russian military and intelligence services on social media 
platforms, designed to influence American political opinion during the 
2016 election and beyond.3 If “data is the currency” of this century, as 
Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella has noted,4 then threats to the integrity of 
our data go to the core of our ability to function as a society. 
In the past year, Facebook has come under increasing pressure to 
monitor its platform for bad actors who created fake pages and fake 
advertisements targeting segments of the social network’s two billion-
person user base.5 Facebook responded to this criticism by developing 
enhanced privacy controls,6 representing a positive step toward giving 
their users more control over the types of ads they will see and how widely 
their personal posts are shared. Nevertheless, the underlying platform 
architecture remains vulnerable to groups that wish to publish false 
accounts relating to highly charged political issues, such as racism, 
immigration rights, and even fake news seeking to foment ethnic 
violence.7 Facebook has announced that it will hire 10,000 security staff 
                                                     
 3. See Alicia Parlapiano & Jasmine C. Lee, The Propaganda Tools Used by Russians to Influence 
the 2016 Election, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/us/ 
politics/russia-propaganda-election-2016.html [https://perma.cc/MJA4-3X9P]; Kim Zetter, The Crisis 
of Election Security, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/ 
magazine/election-security-crisis-midterms.html [https://perma.cc/T23G-YZ6Y]. 
 4. Satya Nadella, Chief Exec. Officer, Microsoft, Remarks at “Convergence” Conference, New 
Orleans, La. (Apr. 4, 2016). 
 5. Taylor Hatmaker, What We Can Learn from the 3,500 Russian Facebook Ads Meant to Stir 
up U.S. Politics, TECHCRUNCH (May 10, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/10/russian-faceb 
ook-ads-house-intelligence-full-list/ [https://perma.cc/7ST5-X7WV]; see also Kathleen Chaykowski, 
Facebook Plans to Add 1,000 Moderators Under Pressure to Address Russian Meddling, FORBES 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2017/10/02/facebook-plans-to-
add-1000-moderators-under-pressure-to-address-russian-meddling/#54fca098185a [https://perma.cc/ 
HJ6K-XQDB]. 
 6. Erin Egan, Giving You More Control of Your Privacy on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/01/control-privacy-principles/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2PWU-P2N5]. 
 7. Frontline: The Facebook Dilemma (PBS television broadcast Oct. 30, 2018). 
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and content monitors to address the problem, underlining how large this 
crisis is for the fourteen-year-old tech company.8 
These events highlight a structural problem in American law. While 
a multitude of federal statutes protect individual data sets—such as health 
care information or student data9—the United States lacks a basic privacy 
right or a privacy law that cuts across wide swaths of personal 
information.10 
The right to be secure in our “persons, houses, papers and effects” 
traces back to the passage of the Fourth Amendment, which became law 
on March 1, 1792, and was announced by none other than Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson.11 Because the U.S. Constitution contains no 
distinct right of privacy, Americans have had to rely on interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment to define the extent of privacy rights, creating great 
uncertainty as to whether government action oversteps the bounds of 
protected privacy.12 Not until 2014, for example, did the Supreme Court 
recognize a distinct privacy right in personal cell phones,13 and in 2018 a 
landmark ruling safeguarded cellular data revealing personal locations.14 
With the evolution of technology, we have mistakenly assumed that 
we can give up a degree of privacy without a commensurate loss of 
freedom. Because of our ability to broadcast our “likes” and opinions on 
Facebook and Twitter, we enjoy a false sense of both agency and 
autonomy. Yet the manipulation of social media platforms only 
underscores their vulnerability.15 In one sense, an open platform such as 
Facebook is only doing what it was designed to do and fulfill a democratic 
mission: To allow any person with an Internet connection to create a 
personal profile and link that profile with others. This process creates a 
                                                     
 8. Sarah Frier, Facebook Says It Will Double Safety and Security Staff to 20,000, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-31/facebook-says-it-will-double 
-safety-and-security-staff-to-20-000. 
 9. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.); Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). 
 10. For a discussion of the United States’ sectoral approach to privacy regulation, see 
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910 (2009); see also Michael C. 
James, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy in the United States, Canada and Europe, 29 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 257, 289–90 (2014). 
 11. RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 222–
23 (2006). 
 12. Schwartz, supra note 10. 
 13. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 14. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 15. For example, Facebook shared the personal data of its users to commercial “partners” without 
user consent in order to provide targeted advertising. Gabriel J.X. Dance, Michael LaForgia & 
Nicholas Confessore, As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy. 
html. 
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“virtuous circle network effect” when the platform reaches a critical mass 
of users, encouraging more people to join and discouraging entry of 
competitors into the market to challenge the leader’s supremacy. Even 
under attack, Facebook has continued to gain users on a global basis.16 
There is an odd note to the criticism that Facebook must do a better 
job regulating speech and controlling what can and cannot be said by its 
users. Facebook, after all, is not a media company. It was founded by tech 
geeks in a college dorm, eager to create a tool to allow college students—
initially in the Ivy League and Stanford—to see each other’s photos. 
Facebook’s first thousand employees had skill sets undoubtedly centered 
on web architecture and distribution of media in a networked environment. 
When founded in 2004, Mark Zuckerberg probably never dreamed that 
Facebook would become a major source of news for billions of users or 
that he would be called upon to adjudicate issues such as what constitutes 
unacceptable “hate speech.”17 
Facebook in many ways is a victim of its own success. A platform of 
two billion connected users might seem to resemble a “utility” or an 
essential communications technology, such as electricity or a phone 
system.18 A company that knows tens of thousands of things about each of 
its users might appear to pose a general threat to individual privacy, even 
if its core economic interest is simply to market goods and services to 
individuals based on their personal habits. Yet, as Facebook’s business 
model evolved, it became increasingly data-driven in order to serve third 
party advertisers—placing a premium on collecting and keeping as much 
information as it could about its users in order to gain a competitive edge 
against competitors such as Google and Twitter.19 
Mr. Zuckerberg infused Facebook with a mission to “make the world 
more open and connected,” when his founding team turned on the lights.20 
This ethos allowed both legitimate and illegitimate actors to populate the 
Facebook neighborhood. It appealed to a libertarian sensibility that people 
                                                     
 16. Josh Constine, Facebook Shares Climb Despite Q3 User Growth and Revenue, 
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 30, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/30/facebook-earnings-q3-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/SEG3-VWGE]. 
 17. Sasse to Zuckerberg: Define Hate Speech, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/video/politics/sasse-to-zuckerberg-define-hate-speech/2018/04/10/857cc8d2-
3d04-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_video.html?utm_term=.afc7e26883ec. 
 18. K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the New 
Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234 (2018). 
 19. Dance, LaForgia & Confessore, supra note 15. 
 20. Mark Zuckerberg, Bringing the World Closer Together, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/bringing-the-world-closer-together/10154944663 
901634/ [https://perma.cc/6WZS-S3RQ]; see also Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg Gives 
Facebook a New Mission, FORBES (June 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchayko 
wski/2017/06/22/mark-zuckerberg-gives-facebook-a-new-mission/#5d5419001343 [https://perma.cc/ 
H6HV-Y7F3]. 
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should be able to do and say what they want in their personal lives and to 
express themselves on their chosen platform. Yet, as Facebook’s platform 
grew and emerged as a dominant source of news and information for its 
users, it developed the need for codes of conduct for acceptable behavior 
and ultimately some sort of internal governing mechanism to enforce those 
codes of conduct. The company developed software filters to combat the 
publication of pornography and other socially unacceptable content and, 
in that process, came to resemble more of a public forum and less of a 
private communications network.21 At a fundamental level, how was 
Facebook supposed to answer the question of “Whose social norms should 
a global company seek to enforce?” With diverse users living in Saudi 
Arabia, China, and Canada, it is not easy to see how Facebook or any 
social media company could ever satisfy all of its disparate and divergent 
constituencies. 
Nevertheless, with the well-documented revelations of manipulation 
by Russians and political groups fomenting violence in Pakistan and 
Myanmar, Facebook can no longer maintain the pose that any member 
could determine social norms and acceptable behavior. It is no longer just 
a tech company. It is now a media company and news organization, 
whether or not it ever wished to become one. As such, Facebook has to 
continuously and rapidly monitor and control user behavior on its sites in 
order to promote political neutrality and to filter out those who wish to 
abuse its founding notions of openness and transparency. 
Protection of privacy constitutes the soft underbelly of Facebook’s 
value. The platform attracts users and advertisers because of its ability to 
connect individuals based on their profiles. On an atomistic level, each 
user might feel “safe” to navigate his or her own connections across the 
platform. Yet, when everyone’s profiles become aggregated and then 
dissected by Artificial Intelligence and other analytic tools, the platform 
becomes vulnerable to manipulation because it represents such a large and 
open target. This paradox will persist. If Facebook’s management pushes 
too hard against the open side of its equation, then it will limit revenue and 
future growth. If it continues to allow unchecked growth, then the 
credibility of content on the site will come under attack and users will turn 
off or tune out. External regulation of its privacy practices may actually 
help the company strike this difficult balance by fostering rules that allow 
for more user control and ultimately less platform manipulation. 
                                                     
 21. Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK (Nov. 2018), https://transparency. 
facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement [https://perma.cc/7GFN-27NF]. 
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III. TECH COMPANIES PUSH BACK AGAINST BIG BROTHER 
The other side of the privacy and freedom coin features a traditional 
enemy of privacy—big government. As if it were not enough that tech 
companies have grappled with the new set of challenges posed by the 
success of their platforms and software applications, they also have 
emerged as important actors in the long-standing debate over the privacy 
of personal communications. 
Only in the past few years have American tech companies such as 
Apple and Microsoft publicly and prominently pushed back against the 
federal government’s attempts to access personal conversations via 
electronic communications.22 What accounts for this contradiction? 
At the most abstract level, experts tend to frame the debate in terms 
of privacy vs. security, focusing on the relatively rare cases where the 
government is seeking to intercept or open an individual’s emails, texts, 
or personal records. The government makes its case, arguing that it must 
vigorously pursue its duty to solve crimes and keep us safe from terrorist 
attacks and other threats to public safety. During the era when the Patriot 
Act reigned with wide latitude—roughly from 2001 through most of 
2015—the federal government enjoyed extraordinary powers to collect the 
bulk data labels that encapsulate phone calls and emails.23 Subjecting such 
data to mathematical analysis, our security agencies then determined 
whether they needed to request a special warrant to read the content of the 
communications. 
This controversy came to a head in several cases that pitted the 
Department of Justice, acting on behalf of the FBI, against Apple 
Computer, with Apple maintaining that it needs to protect the privacy 
rights of its customers and therefore will not go to extraordinary lengths 
to open encrypted phones. One New York magistrate ruled that the FBI 
had no right to ask an American company to break into its own phones and 
violate the private communications of its customers.24 The judge 
vociferously stated that it was absurd for the FBI to try to apply the All 
Writs Act, passed in 1789, to ask a modern technology company to write 
computer code to further the execution of a law enforcement action.25 
In the better known California case, Apple lost the early rounds of 
the proceedings, with the federal court holding that it should be compelled 
                                                     
 22. For recent litigation, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018); In re 
Search of an Apple iPhone, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (order 
compelling Apple, Inc. to assist agents in search). 
 23. See Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign 
Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12–14 (2014). 
 24. In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 25. Id. 
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to open the iPhone of terrorist suspect Syed Rizwan Farook, who, along 
with his wife, perpetrated the San Bernardino rampage that killed fourteen 
people and wounded twenty-two in December of 2015.26 The FBI seized 
three iPhones from Farook, one of which was an iPhone issued by his 
employer, which he apparently used for communication related to his job 
at the County Department of Health.27 This iPhone 5c had security 
measures that prevented multiple attempts to “brute force” a guess of the 
phone’s four-digit passcode.28 While the legal case was pending, the FBI 
found a hacker who was able to circumvent the software that limited the 
phone’s passcode entry function, enabling the FBI to randomly generate 
the correct code.29 Not surprisingly, Farook’s work phone did not contain 
the type of valuable information the FBI had hoped would lead them to 
advance their investigation into the motives and network of Farook and 
his spouse, who both died in a shootout after the attack. 
In the case of United States v. Microsoft Corp.,30 Microsoft staunchly 
resisted a DOJ subpoena for emails stored by Microsoft’s Hotmail email 
service on a computer server in Ireland.31 Microsoft maintained that our 
domestic DOJ subpoenas should not have extraterritorial effect.32 The 
Justice Department countered that, in an age of cloud computing, such data 
was only a few computer clicks away from Microsoft’s platform 
controllers and could rapidly be retrieved.33 Physical location, in this 
sense, no longer matters in an era of universal bit storage in virtual 
environments.34 While the Microsoft case was pending after a hearing in 
the Supreme Court in February of 2018, Congress passed the CLOUD Act, 
resolving the matter in a way that allows the DOJ to access some data 
stored overseas, but with privacy protections largely determined by the 
local law of the foreign country.35 
In these dramatic cases it is tempting to conclude that the key issue 
is a balance between privacy interests and national-security interests, but 
this might not be the most useful way to frame the problem. The FBI seeks 
to decrypt the communication devices of terrorists in extraordinary cases. 
                                                     
 26. See In re Apple iPhone, 2016 WL 618401. 
 27. See generally Danny Yadron, San Bernardino iPhone: U.S. Ends Apple Case After Accessing 
Data Without Assistance, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2016/mar/28/apple-fbi-case-dropped-san-bernardino-iphone [https://perma.cc/N42P-DN7L]. 
 28. See generally id. 
 29. See generally id. 
 30. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1187. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), Pub. L. No. 115-141, div. V, 
132 Stat. 348, 1213–25 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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In the normal course, Apple users text and phone their friends, families, 
and business contacts tens of millions of times a day.36 Our judicial system 
has proven methods to resolve the edge cases where the FBI asks a 
company to do something extraordinary, such as write a new program to 
defeat its own software. Whether or not a technology company or the DOJ 
wins or loses a particular case of this nature does not detract from the 
principle that private communications of American citizens should remain 
private. 
Citizens of other countries would consider it a luxury to live in a 
society where technology companies have redress to the courts to try to 
prevent the government from snooping on private communications. In 
modern day Iran or China, for example, citizens cannot freely assemble or 
vocally protest government actions without becoming targets for 
surveillance or imprisonment.37 When a citizen is shadowed by secret 
police and beaten when seeking to make court appearances to defend 
dissidents, the notion of privacy ceases to exist. In today’s Russia, 
hundreds of courageous investigative journalists and vocal political 
opponents have been jailed or murdered.38 In China, the state arrests 
human rights lawyers on the courtroom steps. Additionally, it has initiated 
a program of mass incarceration of the Uyghur ethnic group in Western 
China without any recourse to the courts.39 
There is very little latitude to protest policy in such societies, where 
the government determines the extent of personal freedom to conduct such 
protests. Privacy is often the first casualty in the persecution of ordinary 
people who dare to stray from the official party line. 
                                                     
 36. Kif Leswing, Apple Says People Send as Many as 200,000 iMessages per Second, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2016, 2:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/eddy-cue-200k-imessages-per-
second-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/FL5N-AQMY]. 
 37. See generally IAN VÁSQUEZ & TANJA PORČNIK, THE HUMAN FREEDOM INDEX 2018: A 
GLOBAL MEASUREMENT OF PERSONAL, CIVIL, AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2018), https://object.cato. 
org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/human-freedom-index-2018-revised.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y9G9-36P8]. 
 38. See generally 58 Journalists Killed in Russia, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, 
https://cpj.org/data/killed/europe/russia/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&ty
pe%5B%5D=Journalist&cc_fips%5B%5D=RS&start_year=1992&end_year=2019&group_by=locat
ion [https://perma.cc/93HX-F5S5]; A List of Murdered Russian Journalists That Moscow Says It 
Didn’t Kill, HAARETZ (May 30, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/a-list-
of-murdered-russian-journalists-that-moscow-says-it-didn-t-kill-1.6133887 [https://perma.cc/T98J-
MUSX]. 
 39. See generally Eva Dou, Jeremy Page & Josh Chin, China’s Uighur Camps Swell as Beijing 
Widens the Dragnet, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-
uighur-camps-swell-as-beijing-widens-the-dragnet-1534534894. 
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IV. FAKE NEWS AS AN INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Even in our terribly warped media environment, a conspiracy theory 
holding that the Sandy Hook parents faked the deaths of their children 
stands out as ugly and offensive. Promulgated by right-wing media outlets, 
such as radio personality Alex Jones, the theory alleged that rather than 
reacting to the tragic school shooting that took twenty-six lives in 2012, 
the Sandy Hook parents were actually actors and that the event had been 
staged.40 In early 2018, several parents filed three defamation lawsuits 
against Alex Jones, host of Infowars, to combat this venomous perversion 
of the deaths of twenty schoolchildren and six teachers at the hands of a 
mentally ill young man in Newtown, Connecticut.41 
Unfortunately, current state privacy and defamation laws make it 
very difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in cases where the stated facts are 
wrong but the subjects of the controversy have become public figures. This 
dates back to the famous case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, where a family was 
thrust into the public eye in 1952 after being taken hostage in a 
Philadelphia suburb for nineteen hours.42 To publicize a new Broadway 
play about the incident, Life Magazine published an account of the hostage 
taking that distorted certain facts about the actual events.43 To get out of 
the public eye, the Hills moved their family out of state and sought to 
protect their privacy to allow their children to grow up in peace.44 Yet, 
their story became the subject of a novel, The Desperate Hours; a popular 
film starring Humphrey Bogart; and a Broadway play.45 Then Life 
Magazine took up the case three years later and thrust the Hills back into 
the public eye.46 The Hills had not claimed defamation by Life Magazine, 
but simply that the iconic American magazine had not done the fact 
checking to accurately report their story.47 
In one of the most important cases in over two hundred years of 
American jurisprudence involving the privacy rights of private individuals 
appearing in news stories, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in January of 
1967 that the Hills could not prevail on a “false light” privacy claim.48 
Future President Richard Nixon argued the case on behalf of the Hill 
                                                     
 40. Elizabeth Williamson, Judge Rules Against Alex Jones and Infowars in Sandy Hook Lawsuit, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/politics/alex-jones-infowars-
sandy-hook-lawsuit.html. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 43. Id. at 377–78. 
 44. Id. at 378. 
 45. Id. at 377–78. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 378. 
 48. Id. at 396. 
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family, doing a masterful job of distinguishing why the family deserved 
the right to sue for damages. In a famous exchange, Nixon plaintively 
asked Justice Hugo Black, “[a]re private persons, involuntarily drawn into 
the vortex of a public issue . . . allowed, in effect, to be used as gimmicks 
for commercial purposes in a falsified situation . . . ?”49 Justice Black and 
his fellow jurists disagreed with Nixon and his clients.50 By a 5–4 vote, the 
Court missed the boat, putting an absolute premium on the magazine’s 
First Amendment rights. 
Had the Court recognized the violation of privacy presented before 
it, our privacy laws would have been strengthened immeasurably for the 
following generations, serving as a guiding light for the era of digital 
technology and the host of devices and apps that threaten personal privacy. 
Having to guard against meritorious suits brought by individuals, 
protection of privacy rights might have limited the evolution of our current 
age of “fake news.” 
I have opined that Time, Inc. v. Hill was wrongly decided and that 
our courts should give victims redress from false stories, even when the 
individuals have been thrust into the public eye against their will.51 The 
Sandy Hook case is a prime example of the hole in our law that allows 
media outlets to spew false narratives about private individuals. Referring 
to the Second Amendment, radio host Alex Jones said, “It is every 
American’s right to question any big event, especially when it’s seized on 
to take the basic liberties of Americans . . . .”52 Yet, no one is questioning 
the right of journalists to ask questions about important stories. At stake 
here is the ability of ideologues to promote false facts and then hide behind 
the First Amendment when they harm private individuals. Let’s hope that 
our courts vindicate the Sandy Hook families, who never should have been 
forced to experience this second nightmare. 
In the meantime, we need to think more deeply about correcting the 
basic flaw in American law relating to privacy and develop a theory of 
privacy as a “human right” akin to the European and other models. 
                                                     
 49. SAMANTHA BARBAS, NEWSWORTHY: THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE OVER PRIVACY AND 
PRESS FREEDOM 222 (2017). 
 50. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 398. 
 51. See generally Alex Alben, Privacy and the Press—An Examination of how the Supreme 
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13 (2017). 
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V. MODERN TECHNOLOGY ENABLES HARASSMENT AND STALKING, 
WITH VERY LITTLE RECOURSE FOR VICTIMS 
Stalking represents a real and present danger in the physical world 
and in online settings. In 2014, Atlantic Magazine reported that one-third 
of women reported being threatened or stalked on the web.53 After an 
individual—a woman in the vast majority of cases—seeks to terminate an 
acquaintance or relationship, her privacy is in jeopardy. Stalkers can use 
public records requests to find the physical and work addresses of their 
targets.54 Hackers can trace online photographs and postings like many 
digital footprints. Victims of stalking often have to erase personal 
histories, get new phone numbers and, in dramatic cases, physically move 
to shield themselves and their loved ones from a stalker’s pursuit.55 While 
some states have passed so-called “revenge porn” statutes, the general 
vulnerability of women to online harassment has not been adequately 
addressed, either in law or public policy.56 
In cases of stalking and harassment, privacy becomes essential for a 
person to live her life with a degree of autonomy, even if that is simply the 
freedom not to worry that a creepy guy is intruding on her online profile. 
In too many cases, the stalker succeeds in violating a target’s physical 
space, leading to physical crimes. Cyberstalking, like political persecution, 
underlines the importance of safeguarding a zone of personal privacy in 
the conduct of our daily lives. 
But what about less dramatic cases? The zone of privacy surely is not 
delimited by political causes or concerns for personal safety.57 The 
ubiquitous spread of municipal surveillance cameras and police body 
cameras makes it likely that the movements of average citizens in public 
spaces will be recorded, tracked, and retained for future analysis for years. 
These technologies highlight the point that Emily Dickinson tried to 
make 140 years ago: Privacy is our natural state; public exposure is 
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artificial.58 Giving up privacy should be a conscious choice, not a special 
exemption from the norm. 
VI. DIGITAL DEVICES, THE INTERNET OF THINGS, AND TECH PLATFORMS 
Most of us using digital devices connected to networks regularly 
share large swaths of data about our personal habits, entertainment 
choices, and geolocation with unseen marketers, to be used in ways we 
have not authorized and may not even understand.59 Our behavior as 
consumers suggests that we will continue to allow for the widespread 
dissemination of our personal information on a broad new range of 
platforms, including Internet-connected devices. Email—both personal 
and corporate—is increasingly vulnerable to attack;60 yet, we treat it quite 
casually and do not contemplate the scenarios where it can be used against 
us, our employers, or our country. 
The same platforms that allow us to organize for a candidate or “meet 
up” to do volunteer service can be used by governments or interlopers to 
monitor our movements and limit the exercise of our rights. 
In sum, we have failed to connect the dots between this loss of 
privacy—some of it voluntary—and constraints on our personal freedom. 
Privacy means much more than the right not to be preyed upon or secretly 
watched. Our privacy not only erodes when the law enforcement exceeds 
its authority or a stalker targets us but also when we allow our personal 
zones of privacy to shrink in favor of commerce and convenience. 
VII. SOLUTIONS 
In order to create a defensible zone of privacy, we will need to define 
it more clearly for the new technologies that continue to shape our digital 
environments. This will include geolocation data for both cell phones and 
automobiles, biometric identifiers, and vast video archives of our 
movements around our neighborhoods and highways. We will need to 
establish much more overt forms of personal consent to such practices, 
whether on the part of government, corporations, or social media. We may 
even need to move toward a more European model, which recognizes the 
importance of data protection as a core human right.61 
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If we fail to get ahead of the technology curve, we will find ourselves 
with shrinking zones of privacy in all aspects of our lives and become more 
vulnerable to our own data being used against us, risking our personal 
freedom. And by the time we recognize this loss it will be too late to 
recover this essential aspect of our humanity. In sum, this Article has 
attempted to outline the following trends facing our social media and 
traditional media environments: 
*Privacy is not only under pressure from government surveillance but 
also corporate profiling and unintended uses. 
*When big corporate platforms—such as Facebook or Twitter— 
come under attack, privacy suffers when identity is compromised, 
and speech rights suffer when identity becomes distorted. The 
experience of the 2016 election established this. 
*Lack of clear privacy law enables attacks against individuals who 
cannot control the media messages propagated against them. 
*Victims of harassment and stalking need more overt policy and 
protection to prevent abuse of technologies that enable such 
behaviors. 
In each of these cases, the solutions will encompass a better 
governance model for corporate technology platforms that serve as speech 
forums and information delivery channels. Broad regulatory regimes—
such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)—will probably have a net positive effect for both freedom and 
democracy, to the extent that individuals regain control over their personal 
information and such information becomes less vulnerable to 
manipulation. Yet the threat will be with us for many years to come; 
advocates of privacy and democracy must remain vigilant. 
